What is it to know? Is it to observe and reason about those aforementioned observations afterwards? If so, under what knowledge do we interpret that which is to be observed to reach that knowledge? Do we need yet another observation to formulate that prior knowledge for interpretation? Where does this cycle end, if it does, and to what end does it aim?
If suppositions are always first, what justifies those? And what is reasonable if reason cannot say anything about what is first supposed, since it inevitably requires it? Is knowledge a faith in the heart of the reasonable, and is it not arbitrary? Is it a thing to be grasped by the mind first as it is in itself before acquiring it?
And how can we search for knowledge if we do not know what we are to look for at all in the first place? And in that regard, is knowledge even possible to grasp, for we have no guarantee that what we know will be as it is and we do not need to relearn it, and if we are relearning it, how do we know we are learning the same thing and not something completely distinct?
We can try to systematize, but we can never only use what is internal to reason for that, and inevitably we must grant existence and truth of knowledge of what is to be known unjustified by reason—and without that, knowing and asking questions means absolutely nothing. And if absolute knowledge is possible, then it is a miracle that requires nothing less than an even greater miracle, nothing less than what can only be described as divine. Even our potential of knowing anything is only heuristic, and certainty only can be narrowly attributed when it comes to philosophy, especially if we defined certainty as relating to strength of purely reasoned arguments and propositions.
The dilemma of knowledge manifests even more problems if we ask ourselves about change, what is it, and whether it has an actual existence and persistence or not, for since I cannot learn or know that change is an illusion or that it does not exist because knowing and learning imply a change from one state to another; from ignorance to knowledge of that reality. And if learning and knowing is also an illusion, then it is not knowing nor learning, and I do not actually know if that is the case at all. Thus I must conclude that things both exist as they are and what they would be, both in absolute being and absolute change, and that enables the act of knowing through a change from ignorance to knowledge and the act of being known through what we are as we are.